Write Your MP — Reconsider the F‑35

Dear [MP's Name] and the Honourable David J. McGuinty, Minister of National Defence,

I am writing as a constituent of [Your Riding] to urge that Canada's ongoing fighter aircraft review seriously reconsider the full 88‑jet F‑35 purchase. The 2026 Iran War has exposed vulnerabilities in this aircraft that should give every Canadian taxpayer and defence planner pause. Combined with ballooning costs and the availability of proven alternatives, I believe there is a compelling case for changing course while the window remains open.

Costs are spiralling beyond control. The original 2023 acquisition price of $19 billion has already risen to $27.7 billion according to the Auditor‑General, with an additional $5.5 billion needed for weapons and base upgrades. The Parliamentary Budget Officer estimates total lifecycle costs at $73.9 billion over 45 years, and independent analysts project the true figure could approach $90 billion when U.S. sustainment cost trends are applied. In the United States, the F‑35 program's lifetime cost has risen from US$1.7 trillion to US$2 trillion in just two years. Canada cannot afford to be locked into a program with this trajectory.

The Iran War has exposed the F‑35's GPS vulnerability. Since Operation Epic Fury began on February 28, 2026, Iran has conducted the largest documented GPS jamming and spoofing campaign in history. Within 24 hours, over 1,100 ships lost navigation in the Persian Gulf. By week's end, Lloyd's List Intelligence recorded 1,735 interference events. The Strait of Hormuz became a GPS dead zone. This is not hypothetical — it is happening now, in a conflict where the F‑35 is the primary Western strike aircraft. The F‑35's precision strike capability and navigation depend heavily on GPS‑guided systems. The U.S. Air Force has been urgently retrofitting F‑15E Strike Eagles with new anti‑jam CRPA antennas mid‑conflict — a clear admission that GPS denial is a real operational threat. On March 19, 2026, a U.S. F‑35A was damaged by Iranian air defences and forced into an emergency landing — the first combat‑related emergency landing in the F‑35's history. The pilot suffered shrapnel wounds.

Stealth is not what Canada needs. The F‑35's primary advantage is stealth — the ability to penetrate heavily defended enemy airspace. But Canada's defence mission is defensive: Arctic sovereignty patrols, NORAD continental defence, and NATO contributions. None of these require a stealth aircraft designed for offensive deep‑penetration strikes. The Iran conflict has shown that even a mid‑tier military power can detect and engage F‑35s using a combination of passive infrared sensors, electronic warfare, and GPS spoofing. The era of stealth invincibility is over.

The Gripen E + GlobalEye alternative aligns with Canada's interests. Sweden's Saab JAS 39 Gripen E was the other finalist in Canada's competition and offers decisive advantages for our actual defence needs:

First, the Gripen operates from 800‑metre highway strips and can be rearmed and refuelled by a small crew in under an hour — ideal for Canada's vast Arctic, where prepared airbases are scarce and enormously expensive to build. Second, at roughly US$8,000–$10,000 per flight hour versus US$36,000 for the F‑35, Gripen generates four times the flying hours for the same budget — or frees billions for other critical capabilities like drones, naval vessels, and Arctic infrastructure. Third, Gripen's open architecture allows Canada to integrate its own navigation, electronic warfare, and sensor systems without waiting for Lockheed Martin's proprietary update cycle or complying with U.S. ITAR export restrictions. This is strategic autonomy in practice.

Fourth, and critically for Canadian industry: Saab's GlobalEye Airborne Early Warning & Control aircraft is built on the Bombardier Global 6000/6500 — a Canadian business jet manufactured in Montréal. Purchasing GlobalEye means Canadian airframes, Canadian technology transfer, and an estimated 12,600 Canadian jobs. This aligns directly with Prime Minister Carney's Defence Industrial Strategy, which calls for prioritising Canadian suppliers, scaling Canadian defence companies, and building strategic autonomy. The competing Boeing E‑7 Wedgetail has no comparable Canadian industrial content.

A practical path forward exists. Canada is contractually committed to only 16 F‑35s. Those aircraft will arrive and can fulfil specialised NATO interoperability roles. The remaining 72 should be replaced with Gripen E fighters paired with GlobalEye surveillance aircraft — a mixed fleet that would cost a fraction of 88 F‑35s, generate far more flight hours, create thousands more Canadian jobs, and provide superior coverage of our vast territory. The RCAF successfully operated mixed fleets until the 1980s.

The time to act is now. Prime Minister Carney has ordered a review of the remaining F‑35 purchase. Portugal has already signalled it will ditch its F‑35 acquisition. Canada has $180 billion in defence procurement opportunities over the next decade. Every dollar locked into a U.S.‑controlled platform with proven battlefield vulnerabilities is a dollar that cannot be invested in Canadian sovereignty, Canadian industry, and Canadian jobs.

I urge you to advocate for a thorough, evidence‑based reassessment that weighs the lessons of the Iran conflict, the reality of GPS‑denied warfare, the exploding lifecycle costs, and the transformative industrial benefits of a Gripen + GlobalEye fleet built in partnership with Canadian aerospace.

Thank you for your attention to this critical matter of national defence and fiscal responsibility.