Ted Lee — Freedom Through Knowledge

Canada is contractually committed to the first 16 F-35 aircraft, with deliveries expected to begin in 2026. But rising costs, software sovereignty concerns, and a formal review ordered by Prime Minister Carney have re-opened the full-fleet debate. The stakes are enormous — not just financially, but strategically.

The F-35's stealth capability is genuine — against the radars it was designed to evade. The aircraft's angular shaping and radar-absorbing coatings dramatically reduce its radar cross-section in the X-band and S-band frequencies used by most fire-control and targeting radars. But stealth is not invisibility, and every stealth design involves trade-offs.

1. VHF/UHF Resonance Scattering

Low-frequency radars operating in the VHF band (30–300 MHz) and UHF band (300 MHz–1 GHz) can detect stealth aircraft because the radar wavelength approaches the physical dimensions of the airframe. This causes a "resonance effect" — the aircraft acts like an antenna, scattering energy in ways that stealth shaping cannot fully mitigate.^[4]

Russia's Nebo-M radar system pairs a VHF detection array (capable of tracking targets with radar cross-sections below 0.01 m² at over 300 km) with a higher-frequency engagement radar. China's JY-27A operates on similar principles. Neither can guide a missile to intercept directly, but they can cue shorter-range, higher-frequency radars for terminal engagement.

2. "Side Painting" — Beam-Aspect Vulnerability

The F-35 (and most first-generation stealth aircraft) is specifically optimised to reduce its radar cross-section from head-on and tail-on aspects. When a radar illuminates the aircraft from the side — at roughly 90 degrees to its axis — the aircraft's flat surfaces, wing leading edges, and fuselage present a significantly larger radar return. This is sometimes called "side painting" or beam-aspect exploitation.^[5]

The tactic requires radar systems with wide spatial coverage and fast processing to catch an aircraft in this orientation. Networked, wide-area ground radar systems — particularly those using passive or bistatic techniques — are designed to exploit exactly this vulnerability.

3. Bistatic and Passive Radar Networks

A bistatic radar separates the transmitter and receiver at different locations. Traditional stealth shaping deflects radar energy away from the transmitter — but some of that deflected energy reaches a distant receiver. A passive radar uses commercial or civilian broadcast signals (FM radio, digital TV, mobile phone towers) as illuminators, making it almost impossible to jam or destroy.^[5]

The most notable public demonstration: In 2019, a German company (Hensoldt) claimed its TwInvis passive radar system tracked two F-35s during a NATO exercise in Germany using repurposed FM radio broadcasts. The claim was disputed by Lockheed Martin but was never definitively refuted by independent parties.

4. Infrared Detection (IRST)

The F-35 is a hot aircraft. Its single engine produces significant infrared emissions, and the aircraft lacks the infrared-suppression technology of some older designs. Infrared Search and Track (IRST) systems — passive, entirely non-emitting sensor systems — can detect and track aircraft heat signatures at ranges of 50–100+ km. Russia's Su-35S and China's J-20 both carry IRST. No stealth coating prevents IR detection.^[5]

5. ELINT — The Radar That Betrays Itself

The F-35's AN/APG-81 AESA radar, its communications systems, and its various electronic warfare emitters all produce electromagnetic emissions that can be intercepted. Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) receivers at long range can detect and locate an aircraft by its own radar emissions — without ever emitting a targeting signal themselves. This is a fundamental trade-off: a fighter cannot use its sensors to find targets without also revealing its own position to anyone listening.^[4]

6. RAM Coating Maintenance in Arctic Conditions

The F-35's Radar-Absorbent Material (RAM) coatings are critical to its stealth performance but are also a known maintenance challenge. The coatings can be damaged by extreme temperature cycling, moisture ingress, and bird strikes. In Canada's Arctic environment — with temperatures that can swing 70°C between seasons and frequent freeze-thaw cycles — maintaining RAM integrity is significantly more demanding than in temperate climates.^[3]

The F-35 also requires pressurized, climate-controlled hangars for RAM maintenance — infrastructure that does not exist at most Canadian northern bases and would require billions in facility upgrades.

Iran's domestically developed Bavar-373 long-range surface-to-air missile system has attracted significant international attention for its claimed ability to detect and track stealth aircraft, including the F-35. The claims are disputed, but the underlying technology is real enough to warrant serious analysis.

What Iran Claims

Iranian military officials have stated that the Bavar-373 uses a combination of S-band AESA and L-band radar — similar to approaches used in Russian and Chinese systems. The L-band component, operating at approximately 1–2 GHz, falls in the range where stealth optimisation begins to degrade. Iran claims the system can theoretically detect stealth aircraft at ranges up to 300 km, with an engagement range of roughly 200 km.^[7]

What Independent Analysts Say

The Strategic Lesson for Canada

Even if Iran's specific claims are exaggerated, the technology trend is clear: dedicated adversaries are investing heavily in multi-layer, multi-spectral air defence specifically designed to counter stealth. Russia and China have more sophisticated versions of the same capabilities. The question Canadian defence planners must ask is not whether the F-35 is currently undetectable — it is whether the stealth advantage justifies the cost premium over the next 40-year lifecycle of Canada's fighter fleet.

The F-35 program has attracted wide criticism for cost overruns, delivery delays, and — increasingly — concerns about strategic dependency on the United States. As U.S. foreign policy has grown more unpredictable under recent administrations, allies are questioning whether tying their entire air force capability to a U.S.-controlled platform is prudent.

The F-35 program has a long history of cost growth. What was promised as an affordable, multi-role aircraft has become the most expensive weapons program in history. For Canada, the numbers continue to move in one direction only.

This is the argument that has gained the most traction in 2025–2026: the F-35 is not simply an aircraft Canada buys — it is an aircraft Canada permanently rents from the United States government, because Lockheed Martin and the U.S. Department of Defense retain control of its most critical operational systems.

The F-35 Sovereignty Problem

The Saab proposal for Canada is not just 72 fighter jets — it is an integrated air defence package built around a proven fighter and a world-class Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, with deep Canadian industrial participation throughout.

Gripen E vs F-35: Key Comparison

1. 1
   19FortyFive — Canada's F-35 Debate Seems Paralyzed — $30 Billion Question. March 2026. Cost rise from C$19B (2023) to C$30B+ documented.
2. 2
   19FortyFive — Gripen Looks Great on Paper — 12,600 Canadian Jobs, Sovereign Data Centre in Montreal. April 2026.
3. 3
   National Defense Magazine — F-35 Program Still Plagued by Cost Overruns, Delivery Delays — GAO Says. September 2025. US$36,000+ cost per flight hour confirmed.
4. 4
   FlyAJetFighter.com — The F-35 Facing Russian and Chinese VHF Radars: Stealth Under Threat. Technical analysis of VHF/UHF detection mechanisms, Nebo-M range data.
5. 5
   FlyAJetFighter.com — How Radars Detect Stealth Aircraft Today. Bistatic radar, passive radar, IRST, and beam-aspect vulnerability explained.
6. 6
   The National Interest — Could Iran's Bavar-373 Air Defense System Take Down an F-35? Analysis of Bavar-373 claims including 2024–25 combat performance failure.
7. 7
   Defence Security Asia — Iran's Bavar-373 Claims Ability to Track F-35 Stealth Jets. Detailed breakdown of system specifications and Iranian official claims.
8. 8
   The Defense Post — Cost Overruns Push Swiss to Buy Fewer F-35s. December 2025. CHF 1.3 billion overrun details.
9. 9
   Reason.com — Allies Cancel Orders of F-35s, the Fighter Jets That Will Cost $2 Trillion. March 2025. Portugal, Canada, Switzerland context.
10. 10
    NPR — Trump's Handling of Ukraine and Tariffs Has NATO Rethinking the U.S.-made F-35 Fighter. March 2025. Belgium, Germany, NATO political context.
11. 11
    National Interest — F-35 or Gripen? Canada's Fighter Jet Dilemma, Explained. Sweden's confidence in Gripen E, NATO interoperability, open architecture advantages.
12. 12
    Simple Flying — Canada Is Secretly Paying For F-35 Parts While Threatening To Buy Sweden's Gripen Instead. ODIN architecture, ITAR dependency, and Canadian strategic tension documented.
13. 13
    CBC News — F-35 Program Facing Skyrocketing Costs, Pilot Shortage and Infrastructure Deficit: AG Report. Canadian Auditor General's findings on F-35 program management and infrastructure gaps.

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