Ted Lee — Freedom Through Knowledge

🤖 Analysis by ChatGPT (GPT-5 Thinking) + Ted Lee editorial additions

🇨🇦 Canada's Fighter Decision — Gripen E vs F-35

Which Fighter Should Canada Buy?
Costs Are Rising. Stealth Has Limits. Countries Are Reconsidering.

A plain-language briefing on the Gripen E vs F-35 debate — including escalating lifecycle costs, real-world stealth limitations, Iran's radar tracking claims, and why multiple allies are having second thoughts.

💰 C$73.9B+ Lifecycle 📡 Radar Defeats Stealth 🌍 Allies Reconsidering 🇨🇦 Arctic Sovereignty ✈️ Gripen E Alternative
ChatGPT Short Recommendation
✈️ Gripen E — Best Value for Canada's Arctic / NORAD Tasks
This is a strategic recommendation oriented toward cost-effective sovereignty patrols, intercepts, and peacetime readiness. If Canada expects to prioritise high-end peer-conflict capability and deep U.S. interoperability above all else, the F-35 remains the higher-capability choice — but at a much greater lifecycle cost, with stealth limitations that are becoming more widely understood, and at a time when several allied nations are publicly reconsidering their F-35 commitments.
C$73.9B
PBO lifecycle cost estimate for Canada's F-35 fleet (2023)[1]
↑ Rising
PBO cost estimate revised upward again, June 2025[2]
~40%
Lower estimated operating cost per flight hour: Gripen vs F-35[3]
6
Countries publicly reassessing F-35 costs or timelines since 2022
📊

Direct Comparison: Gripen E vs F-35 vs Super Hornet

Factor Gripen E F-35A Lightning II Super Hornet F/A-18E
Acquisition cost per unit Lowest ~US$60–75M ~US$80–100M+ ~US$70–80M
Lifecycle / sustainment (Canada) Substantially lower C$73.9B+ PBO est.[1] Moderate
Cost per flight hour (est.) ~US$4,700–6,000 ~US$36,000+ ~US$11,000
Stealth / low-observable Non-stealth; modern AESA radar + IRST[4] Full stealth (X-band optimised) Non-stealth; mature sensors
Stealth vs low-frequency radar N/A — no stealth penalty VHF/UHF radars can detect[6] N/A — no stealth penalty
Arctic / austere basing Highway strips, short runway Needs prepared bases Needs prepared bases
Maintenance complexity Small crew; field maintainable Specialized logistics chain Mature supply chain
US/NATO interoperability Good (Link 16, NATO standard) Excellent (MADL + F-35 net) Excellent
US ITAR / export controls Independent upgrade paths All upgrades US-controlled US-controlled
Canadian industrial benefit GlobalEye on Bombardier jets; assembly offers Limited supply chain share Some components
Sensor fusion AESA + IRST; good situational awareness[4] DAS + EOTS + APG-81: best in class[5] Good; APG-79 AESA

Cost figures are estimates drawn from publicly available sources and manufacturer briefings. Actual contracted costs vary. CPFH figures are widely reported ranges and may differ from classified operational data.

💰

The F-35 Cost Problem: Canada's Ballooning Commitment

When Canada selected the F-35 as its CF-18 replacement, the projected lifecycle cost was presented as manageable. Subsequent independent analysis tells a very different story — and costs keep climbing.

1
PBO November 2023: C$73.9 Billion Lifecycle Cost

Canada's Parliamentary Budget Officer published an independent analysis estimating the full lifecycle cost of Canada's planned F-35 purchase at approximately C$73.9 billion — a figure that includes acquisition, operating, sustainment, and eventual retirement costs over the fleet's service life.[1] This was significantly higher than government projections at the time of contract announcement.

2
Reuters June 2025: Costs Set to Rise Further

A Reuters report in June 2025 indicated the cost of Canada's F-35 fleet was set to rise again, with the independent watchdog warning the final bill would exceed even the PBO's revised estimates.[2] Inflation, currency fluctuations, supply chain disruptions, and the complexity of the sustainment program all contribute to ongoing cost growth.

3
The CPFH Problem: US$36,000+ Per Flight Hour

The F-35's cost per flight hour is among the highest of any Western fighter. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has repeatedly flagged CPFH as a chronic problem, with figures ranging from US$28,000 to over US$44,000 depending on variant, operating tempo, and whether depot maintenance is included.[7] For routine NORAD intercept and Arctic sovereignty patrols — the majority of Canada's actual mission requirement — this represents extraordinary cost for work that a Gripen E can perform at a fraction of the price.

4
Sustainment: The Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS / ODIN)

The F-35's maintenance is managed through a proprietary Lockheed Martin logistics system (originally ALIS, now ODIN). All maintenance data flows through Lockheed Martin's servers, meaning the manufacturer retains real-time visibility into every allied air force's readiness, sortie rates, and mission profiles. For a country like Canada that values sovereignty, this represents a structural intelligence dependency on a U.S. corporation — and a potential vulnerability in any scenario where U.S.-Canada relations are strained.[8]

Bottom line on cost: The F-35 is the most expensive fighter jet Canada has ever considered purchasing — not just in acquisition price, but in total lifecycle cost. For a nation whose primary air defence requirement is NORAD sovereignty patrols over vast, sparsely populated territory, the capability premium commands a price that is increasingly difficult to justify against alternatives.
📡

Stealth Has Limits: How Radar Is Catching Up to the F-35

The F-35's primary selling point is its low-observable (stealth) design — achieved through radar-absorbent materials (RAM), carefully shaped surfaces, and internal weapons carriage to minimize radar cross-section (RCS). This works exceptionally well against the specific radar frequencies for which it is optimized. The problem is that stealth is not absolute, and adversaries have studied these limitations for decades.

How Stealth Works — and Where It Fails

The F-35's stealth shaping is optimized primarily for X-band radar (8–12 GHz), the frequency used by most modern fire-control radars and surface-to-air missile guidance systems. At these frequencies, careful shaping, RAM coatings, and edge alignment produce dramatic reductions in radar cross-section — potentially from the size of a barn door to the size of a golf ball or marble.

However, physics imposes limits. At lower frequencies — VHF (30–300 MHz) and UHF (300 MHz–1 GHz) — the wavelength of the radar signal approaches or exceeds the dimensions of the aircraft's features (wings, fuselage, tail). At this scale, a phenomenon called resonance scattering occurs: the stealth shaping becomes far less effective, and the aircraft produces a significantly larger radar return than at X-band frequencies.[6]

The physics problem: Stealth coating and shaping that reduces an aircraft's X-band RCS to the size of a golf ball may only reduce its VHF-band RCS to the size of a car. Low-frequency radars can see stealth aircraft — they just cannot provide the precision needed to guide a missile. The challenge for adversaries has been combining wide-area low-frequency detection with precise targeting data.

"Side Painting" — Aspect Angle Exploitation

Stealth shaping concentrates radar energy deflection toward the front and rear of the aircraft. The side aspect — viewing the aircraft from the beam (perpendicular to its flight path) — produces a larger radar cross-section than the frontal or rear aspects, because the broad fuselage and wing surfaces present a larger reflective area that is harder to fully optimize for all aspect angles simultaneously.[6]

This is sometimes called "side painting" in defence analysis circles — using radar geometry to deliberately interrogate the aircraft from its weakest stealth angle. By positioning radar emitters to the side of an expected flight path, or using bistatic radar (where the transmitter and receiver are in different locations), adversaries can exploit the aircraft's least-stealthy aspect.

📡
VHF/UHF Low-Frequency Radars
Russia's Nebo-M (VHF), Nebo-SVU, and Protivnik-GE radars are specifically designed to detect low-observable aircraft. These systems use long wavelengths that interact with stealth aircraft in ways that defeat the RCS reduction engineered for X-band systems.[9] Russia has exported versions of these capabilities and their design philosophy globally.
🔀
Bistatic Radar Geometry
Bistatic radar separates the transmitter from the receiver, allowing the receiver to detect energy scattered away from the threat aircraft in directions the stealth shaping does not account for. Widely available passive radar receivers can exploit existing civilian FM and TV broadcasts as illuminators, detecting stealth aircraft without revealing the receiver's location.[6]
🌡️
Infrared / Heat Signatures
Stealth addresses radar cross-section but does not eliminate infrared (IR) signatures. A flying F-35 produces engine heat, exhaust plumes, and aerodynamic friction heating. Modern IR search and track (IRST) systems — including China's and Iran's — can detect and track aircraft via IR without emitting radar, providing a passive detection capability not defeated by radar stealth.[4]
🌐
ELINT and Emissions
The F-35 emits electronic signals — communications, identification transponders, radar altimeters, and even the AESA radar itself. Sophisticated electronic intelligence (ELINT) receivers can track aircraft by their electronic emissions, independent of radar cross-section. True "silent" operations require strict emissions control that constrains the F-35's mission effectiveness.

Iran's Claims: Tracking the F-35

Iran has made multiple public claims of detecting and tracking Israeli F-35s ("Adir" variant) during their operations over Syrian and Iranian airspace. These claims, while subject to propaganda considerations, align with documented Iranian investments in low-frequency radar systems and their publicly stated air defence philosophy of layering multiple detection methods.[10]

Iran's Bavar-373 long-range air defence system, revealed in 2019, incorporates a phased array radar with claimed low-observable aircraft detection capability. Iran has also acquired and studied Russian Nebo-series radar documentation and has domestic radar development programs specifically aimed at defeating low-observable aircraft.[10]

During Israeli F-35 strikes on Iranian-linked targets in Syria, Iran has repeatedly claimed advance warning and tracking — though it has not been able to engage the aircraft at range due to the combination of standoff weapons, electronic warfare, and mission planning designed to degrade tracking quality enough to prevent missile guidance solutions even when surveillance detection is achieved.

The key distinction: There is a critical difference between detection (knowing a stealth aircraft is somewhere in a region) and tracking (knowing precisely where it is with enough accuracy to guide a weapon). Low-frequency radars can increasingly achieve detection. Achieving weapon-quality tracking remains much harder — but the gap is narrowing, and the investment required to close it is far less than the cost of the stealth aircraft being countered.

The RAM Coating Maintenance Problem

The F-35's radar-absorbent material (RAM) coating is applied to the aircraft's exterior and is essential to its stealth performance. This coating is fragile — it is damaged by rain, bird strikes, ground handling, and routine maintenance activities. Maintaining the coating to specification requires significant maintenance man-hours, specialized facilities, and proprietary materials.[11]

The UK's Royal Navy discovered that the F-35B's RAM coating was incompatible with high-humidity maritime environments and the salt spray of carrier operations. The coating degraded faster than expected, requiring frequent and expensive reapplication. This is not a unique problem — every F-35 operator has found that maintaining stealth specifications in operational conditions is far more resource-intensive than peacetime test environments suggested.

Strategic implication for Canada: Canada's Arctic environment — extreme cold, blowing ice crystals, remote basing, and limited maintenance facilities — is among the harshest possible operating environments for a RAM-coated aircraft. Maintaining F-35 stealth performance in Canadian Arctic forward operating locations presents challenges that do not exist for non-stealth alternatives like the Gripen E.
🌍

Countries Having Second Thoughts

Canada is not alone in wrestling with F-35 cost and sovereignty concerns. Numerous allied nations have either delayed, reduced, reconsidered, or publicly expressed reservations about their F-35 commitments since the program's costs became clearer.

🇨🇦
Canada — Costs Keep Rising
The PBO's C$73.9B lifecycle estimate (2023) was already a shock to the Canadian public.[1] A June 2025 Reuters report indicates costs are set to rise further.[2] With only 88 jets planned, this represents extraordinary per-unit lifecycle cost. Questions about sovereignty, ITAR dependency, and whether this investment crowds out other defence priorities are growing louder in parliamentary debate.
🇳🇴
Norway — Significantly Over Budget
Norway was an early F-35 partner and one of the first to receive deliveries. Despite this head start, Norwegian parliamentary auditors found that the program's costs significantly exceeded original projections, with sustainment costs in particular running well above estimates. Norway has also had to invest heavily in base infrastructure upgrades required by the F-35 that were not included in initial cost projections.[12]
🇧🇪
Belgium — Legal Challenges and Controversy
Belgium's 2018 F-35 selection was challenged in Belgian courts on grounds of procurement process irregularities, with advocacy groups arguing the Eurofighter and Rafale were scored unfairly. Though the selection ultimately survived legal challenge, the process exposed tensions in how European nations balance U.S. alliance pressure against domestic industrial interests and independent defence policy.[13]
🇩🇪
Germany — Limited F-35 Adoption
Germany chose to buy only a limited number of F-35As (approximately 20) specifically for NATO nuclear sharing mission requirements — while standardizing the bulk of its fighter fleet on the Eurofighter. This two-fleet approach reflects Germany's deliberate choice to retain European strategic autonomy for most missions while meeting alliance obligations for the specific nuclear role that only the F-35 currently fulfils in NATO context.
🇨🇭
Switzerland — Controversial Selection
Switzerland's 2021 selection of the F-35A over the Gripen E, Rafale, and Eurofighter was immediately controversial. Critics noted that Switzerland's neutrality status and its constitutional prohibition on participating in foreign military alliances raises questions about ITAR-controlled aircraft and U.S. data sovereignty over Swiss military operations. A referendum to reverse the decision gathered significant public support, reflecting genuine national unease with the implications of the choice.
🇦🇺
Australia — Operating Costs Higher Than Projected
Australia's F-35A fleet has experienced higher than projected operating costs and availability rates lower than initially modelled. The Australian National Audit Office has flagged sustainment cost growth as a continuing concern. Australia also operates in environments — tropical humidity, dust, salt air — that accelerate RAM coating degradation, adding unexpected maintenance burden.[14]
The pattern: In virtually every country that has operated the F-35 for more than a few years, the same story emerges: costs higher than projected, sustainment more complex than anticipated, and base infrastructure investments that were not included in the original acquisition price. The aircraft's capabilities remain impressive — but the total cost of ownership continues to exceed what was sold to legislatures at the time of commitment.
✈️

Why the Gripen E Makes Sense for Canada

Against this backdrop — rising F-35 costs, narrowing stealth advantages, and growing allied concerns — the Gripen E's specific characteristics align well with Canada's actual operational requirements.

✅ Gripen E Strengths
  • Lowest lifecycle cost of any comparable Western fighter
  • Highway and short-strip basing for Arctic dispersal
  • Rapid turnaround — 10-man crew, 1-hour mission prep
  • Open architecture — Canada controls its own upgrades
  • No ITAR restrictions; no U.S. data dependency
  • GlobalEye on Bombardier jets = Canadian jobs
  • Saab offers technology transfer and local assembly
  • Leonardo Skyward-G IRST for passive tracking[4]
  • AESA radar comparable to peer non-stealth fighters
  • NATO standard Link 16 datalink interoperability
  • Cold-weather operations proven in Swedish service
  • No fragile RAM coating to maintain in Arctic
⚠️ Gripen E Limitations
  • No stealth — fully visible to modern radar
  • Smaller weapons payload than F-35 or Super Hornet
  • No MADL datalink — limited F-35 net integration
  • Shorter combat radius than F-35A unrefuelled
  • Smaller fleet = fewer economies of scale in Canada
  • Less proven in high-intensity peer conflict scenarios
  • U.S. political pressure against non-American platforms
  • Requires GlobalEye AEW-C to compensate for non-stealth

The Arctic Sovereignty Argument

The vast majority of Canada's day-to-day fighter requirement involves NORAD sovereignty patrols — intercepting Russian Bear bombers approaching Canadian airspace, monitoring shipping lanes, and maintaining visible presence over remote northern territory. These missions do not require stealth. They require range, reliability, cold-weather capability, and the ability to operate from dispersed forward locations that lack the infrastructure needed by the F-35.

The Gripen E can operate from a 1,600-metre section of highway. The F-35 requires a fully prepared air base with specialized maintenance facilities, climate-controlled storage for RAM coating materials, and connectivity to the ODIN logistics network. In a conflict scenario involving strikes on Canadian air bases — a genuine strategic concern — the Gripen's dispersion capability becomes a survivability asset that the F-35 lacks.

The Gripen + GlobalEye Combination

The Gripen E's non-stealth limitation is largely addressed by pairing it with the Saab GlobalEye airborne early warning and control (AEW-C) system. GlobalEye's Erieye ER radar provides 360° surveillance across air, sea, and land at extended ranges. Gripen fighters receive real-time targeting data from GlobalEye, giving the combined system capability well beyond what either platform achieves alone.

Critically, GlobalEye is built on the Bombardier Global 6000/6500 business jet platform — manufactured in Canada. This means Canada's GlobalEye procurement directly supports Canadian aerospace jobs, Canadian industrial capability, and Canadian supply chain development in ways that an E-7 Wedgetail or E-3 AWACS purchase cannot match.

▶️

Watch: Gripen vs F-35 Analysis

📺 Gripen E vs F-35 — Independent Analysis
Independent analysis of the Gripen E vs F-35 comparison — capabilities, costs, and operational context.
⚡

At-a-Glance: All Three Fighters

✈️
Gripen E — Best Value
Low CPFH (~US$5,000). Highway basing. Canadian industrial ties via GlobalEye/Bombardier. Open architecture sovereignty. Cold-weather proven. No RAM maintenance. Recommended for Canada's primary NORAD/Arctic mission.
🔺
F-35A — Best Capability
Unmatched sensor fusion and stealth vs X-band fire control radars. But: C$73.9B+ lifecycle, US$36K+ CPFH, US sovereignty over all upgrades and data, RAM maintenance burden, needs prepared bases, stealth increasingly challenged by VHF/bistatic/IR detection.
⚓
Super Hornet — Safe Proven Choice
Mature platform, lower risk, proven supply chain, strong US interoperability. Mid-range cost. Non-stealth. Less capable than F-35 in contested airspace, but more affordable for the bulk of Canada's actual mission profile.
ChatGPT's bottom line: Canada's actual threat environment — NORAD sovereignty patrols, Arctic intercepts, and continental defence — does not primarily require the capabilities that justify the F-35's extraordinary cost premium. A Gripen E + GlobalEye combination delivers adequate capability for Canada's real-world requirements at a fraction of the lifecycle cost, with greater industrial benefits and strategic autonomy. If Canada also needs a high-end peer-conflict capable asset in limited numbers for NATO Article 5 scenarios, a mixed fleet (Gripen + small F-35 buy) could satisfy both requirements at lower total cost than an all-F-35 fleet.

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Sources

All factual claims are drawn from the following publicly available sources. Numbered citations appear throughout the page.

  1. 1
    Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO), Canada — "Life-Cycle Cost of Canada's F-35 Program: A Fiscal Analysis," November 2, 2023. Estimated C$73.9B lifecycle cost. pbo-dpb.ca
  2. 2
    Reuters — "Cost of Canada's new U.S.-made fighter jet fleet set to rise, watchdog says," June 10, 2025. reuters.com
  3. 3
    Saab AB — Gripen E capability briefing, cost-per-flight-hour comparison data, Arctic and austere basing specifications. saab.com
  4. 4
    Leonardo (formerly Selex ES) — Skyward-G IRST system for Gripen; passive infrared search and track capability. leonardo.com
  5. 5
    Lockheed Martin — F-35 Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS) and Distributed Aperture System (DAS) overview. lockheedmartin.com
  6. 6
    Multiple defence analysis sources — Low-frequency radar defeat of stealth: Resonance scattering at VHF/UHF, bistatic radar, and side-aspect RCS exploitation. See: Wikipedia: Stealth Technology; Journal of Electronic Defense; Aviation Week & Space Technology reporting on VHF radar programs.
  7. 7
    U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) — Multiple annual F-35 program assessments documenting cost per flight hour, sustainment challenges, and program delays. gao.gov
  8. 8
    Defense News / Breaking Defense — Reporting on F-35 ALIS/ODIN logistics system, data sovereignty concerns, and allied air force operational data flowing through Lockheed Martin servers. Multiple articles 2019–2024.
  9. 9
    Jane's / IHS Markit — Russia's Nebo-M VHF radar system specifications and anti-stealth design philosophy. Also: Wikipedia: Nebo SVU. Nebo-M combines VHF, UHF, and L-band arrays specifically to counter low-observable aircraft.
  10. 10
    Multiple sources on Iran radar claims — Iran's Bavar-373 air defence system specifications (IRNA/Press TV official announcements); reporting on Iranian claims to have detected Israeli F-35s: The Jerusalem Post, Times of Israel, Al-Monitor, and Breaking Defense, various dates 2019–2024.
  11. 11
    UK National Audit Office / House of Commons Defence Committee — Reports on F-35B RAM coating degradation in Royal Navy carrier operations, maintenance costs, and humidity/salt environment challenges. nao.org.uk
  12. 12
    Norwegian Riksrevisjonen (Office of the Auditor General) — Reports on Norwegian F-35 program cost overruns and sustainment cost growth relative to original projections. riksrevisjonen.no
  13. 13
    Belgian Federal Parliament / Belgian press (De Standaard, Le Soir) — Reporting on legal challenges to Belgium's F-35 procurement selection and court proceedings, 2018–2022.
  14. 14
    Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) — F-35A sustainment cost analysis, availability rate reporting. anao.gov.au
  15. 15
    Associated Press — Canada F-35 purchase announcement and cost reporting, January 9, 2023. apnews.com
  16. 16
    Wikipedia reference articles — Saab JAS 39 Gripen; AN/AAQ-37 DAS; F-35 Lightning II.

⚖️ Disclaimer & Authorship

Authorship note: The recommendation and core analysis on this page were generated by ChatGPT (GPT-5 Thinking mini) using publicly available reports, manufacturer disclosures, and media coverage, as part of Ted Lee's research process. Ted Lee has added editorial expansions, additional sourcing, and contextual material. This is not affiliated with the Government of Canada, Saab, Lockheed Martin, or any defence contractor. Date of ChatGPT analysis: November 28, 2025.

For educational and informational purposes only. Nothing on this page constitutes official procurement analysis, military advice, government policy, or a recommendation to any defence department, government body, or official. The analysis reflects open-source research and personal opinion.

Not an official procurement document. Canada's F-35 selection is a contracted government decision. This page analyses publicly available information about that decision and presents an alternative perspective for public discussion. It does not represent the official position of the Government of Canada, the Department of National Defence, Saab AB, or Lockheed Martin.

Defence classification caveat. Actual radar cross-section data, CPFH figures under specific operational conditions, and classified performance parameters for all aircraft discussed are not publicly available. All figures cited are from open-source reports, manufacturer briefings, and publicly disclosed government documents. Actual classified performance may differ significantly.

Iran radar claims. Iranian government claims about the detection of stealth aircraft are presented as reported statements from Iranian sources and defence analysts commenting on those claims. These claims have not been independently verified by Western intelligence agencies in the public domain. They are presented for analytical context, not as confirmed fact.

No liability. The author assumes no liability for any decision made by any government, organization, or individual based on the content of this page. Procurement decisions of this magnitude require formal government analysis, security-cleared assessment, and professional defence expertise far beyond the scope of this educational page.

Always consult qualified professionals. Defence procurement decisions involve classified threat assessments, alliance obligations, industrial policy, and national security considerations that cannot be fully addressed in a public webpage. This page is a starting point for public discussion, not a substitute for professional analysis.